The main result is that in perfectly competitive markets, every value allocation is competitive. The model used is that of a non-atomic continuum of traders, both in a Walrasian and in a transferable utihty (monetary) market. No differentiability assumptions are made. The problems of existence of the value and of the converse to the above result (i.e., that every competitive allocation is a value allocation) are also studied.
Introduction
The Value Equivalence Principle states that in a sufficiently differentiable perfectly competitive market, the set of value allocations coincides with the set of competitive allocations.
By a 'perfectly competitive' market it is meant one in which every single trader is negligible.
A 'differentiable' market is one where the preference relations of all the traders are representable by differentiable (or smooth) utility functions.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the above principle in general markets -i.e., not necessarily differentiable.
We represent the 'perfectly competitive' market by a non-atomic continuum of traders [cf. Aumann (1964) ], and we use the asymptotic approach for the concept of vaIue [cf. Aumann and Shapley (1974) , Aumann (1975) ]. The two kinds of markets are studied -Walrasian (without transferable utility) and monetary (with transferable utility).
The main result is that one direction of the Value Principle is always true, namely, that in a perfectly competitive market, every value allocation is cotnpetitive. This can be interpreted to mean that the allocation of marginal contributions, if it is feasible, is also competitive. The reader is referred to Shapley OThis paper is part of the author's Ph.D. thesis done under the supervision of Professor R.J. Aumann. It was supported by the Council for Research and Development in Israel. The author wishes to thank Professor R.J. Aumann for his help and guidance in all stages of the preparation of this paper. Present address: Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305, USA. (1967) and Aumann (1975, $1 and §6) , for detailed intuitive discussions and interpretations of these concepts.
Next, it is shown that the second direction of the Principle -i.e., that every competitive allocation is a value allocation -is no longer true for all markets. However, it is proved that, at least in the transferable utility case, the Value Equivalence Principle holds for almost every market.
A parallel development should be noted here. It is based on a limit approachfinite markets with a fixed number of types of traders, in which the number of traders in each type goes to infinity (replica economies).
To place this work in its 'context' of research done on the relation between competitive and value allocations, table 1 is useful. The results of this paper were made possible by the development of the theory of asymptotic value for a class of non-atomic games which are, in some sense, non-differentiable [Hart (1977) ].
The paper is organized as follows: the main results are included in section 3 (for monetary markets) and in section 4 (for Walrasian markets), whereas section 2 is devoted to the model and some preliminary results.
The book of Aumann and Shapley (1974) being a used reference, it will be abbreviated by A&S.
Preliminaries
We begin by recalling the basic mathematical model. The measurable space (1, %) is the trader space and p is a non-atomic non-negative o-additive measure defined on V, satisfying, without loss of generality, p(I) = 1. We also assume (I, U) to be a standard measurable space [i.e., isomorphic to the unit interval with the Bore1 sets -cf. A&S (2.1)]. Since all integrals will be with respect to p, we will usually drop the symbol dp: when the integral is over all I, we will write J instead of JI. The commodity space is Sz, the non-negative orthant of the Z-dimensional Euclidian space. For x in CC?, xi will denote its jth coordinate. The initial allocation1 a is a measurable function from I to Q. We assume every commodity to be actually present in the market, i.e.,' (2.1) S a 4 0.
To each trader t in I corresponds a real-valued function ut defined on SL, called the utility function of t. All utility functions will be normalized by u,(O) = 0. The following assumptions are made:
Weak monotonicity.'
x 2 y implies u,(x) >= u,(y) for all t in I,
Continuity. u, is a continuous function, for all t E I, (2.4) Measurability. u,(x), as a function of (x, t), is measurable in the product field %? x gz, where L# denotes the Bore1 o-field on Sz, (2.5) q(x) = o(j 1 x 1 I) as 11 x 11 + co, integrably in t.
The first three assumptions are standard. As for the last one, this is the AwnannPerles (1965) condition. The non-atomic game a is defined by (2.6) u(S) = max { Js u,@(t)) dp(t) ] Ss a = Js x and x(t) E 0 for all t e S>, for all SE %'. The maximum is attained [this follows from (2.4) and (2.5) by the main theorem in Aumann-Perles (1965) ]. For a discussion on the economic meaning of u see A&S ($30). The usual interpretation is that there is money in the market, and each trader's utility increases by one unit for each unit of money added. Then v(S) is the maximum utility the coalition S can get by using its own initial resources alone, with unrestricted side payments between its members. This model is called: a market with transferable utility, or a monetary market.
From now on, we will identify u with the market it arose from.
'Boldface letters will denote functions on I. 2Forx,yinS2,x~ymeansx'>y~forallj=1,..., I, and x 2 y means xJ 2 y' for all j=l 9 * * *, I.
An allocation is an integrable function x from Z to B such that A transferable utility competitive equilibrium (t.u.c.e.) is a pair (x, p), where x is an allocation and p E Q, such that for almost all t E Z,
for all x E Q. The measure v defined by Apply (2.7) to x = z(t) to get
(2.11) u,MO> -P * (z(t) -4t)) 5 utCx(t)) -p * (x(t) -a(t)),
for almost all t E I. Since s z = s x = J a, the integration over Z gives (2.12) j u,cdO) s j uMt>>.
But v(Z) is attained at z, therefore we must have equality in (2.12), hence also in (2.1 I), for almost all t E I, which proves the proposition.
In the following, let z be a fixed allocation at which v(Z) is attained, and define
(2.13) 57s) = ss u,(z(t)) du(t),
(2.14) c'(S) = js (uj-z'j, for j = 1, . . . . Z, for all S E %'. Then co is a non-atomic measure, and c = ([I, . . . , 5') is a vector of non-atomic measures. The set of all competitive prices, i.e., the set of all p in 52 such that (x,p) is a t.u.c.e. for some allocation X, will be denoted by P. For every p in 0, let (2.15) vp = 5O+-P * 5, then we get:
The core of v is the set of all vg for p in P.
Proof.
Propositions 2.9 and 2.10.
Two characterizations of P are given in the next propositions. Let f be a real-valued function on .52, and let z E a. The vector p E R is called a super-gradient off at z if
for all x E 0, i.e., if the hyper-plane with 'slope' p through f(z) is always 'above' f. Let df(z) denote the set of supergradients off at z. If f is concave, then df(z) is non-empty for every z b 0; if, moreover, f is differentiable, then the only point in df(z) is the gradient off at z [see Rockafellar (1970, $23, $25 and p. 308) ]. Let A, be a set for all t in I. The essential intersection of A, for all t in I is defined to be the set of all points belonging to almost3 all A,. We will denote this set by ess.n,,,d,.
(2.17) Proposition.4
Let z and P be as above. Then P = ess.n ,,14(Gt))*
Immediate from the definition of t.u.c.e. and Proposition 2.10.
This means that a vector P in Sz is a competitive price if and only if it is a super-gradient of U, at z(t) for almost all t in I.
(2.18) Example.
Let 1 = 1, and assume half the traders have utility function ul, and the other half utility z+, (see fig. 2 .19). Then the onZy competitive price is p.
3With respect to .u. 4Robert J. Aumann, private communication. As in A&S ($36) we will define the function u, on Q by
for all a E 8. Note that the maximum is attained, and where z is the allocation defined above.
(2.20) Proposition. 5 Let P and u, be as above, then P = du,(Ja).
Proof. First, assume p E P, and let a E Sz. Then ul(a) is attained at some X. Using Proposition 2.17, we get for almost every c in I. By integrating over I, it follows that Second, assume p 4 P. Again, by Proposition 2.17, there is a set S E V of positive measure and a vector x(t) E !A for every t in S, such that 5Robert J. Aumann, private communication.
for all t E S. Define x(t) = z(t) for t $ S, then we get equality in (2.21) for those t.
Integrating over all I (recall that S has positive measure) we get Denote a = jx, then the definition of U, implies that hence p 4 Au,(Ja).
Monetary markets
This section includes the main results for markets with transferable utility (i.e., monetary markets).
First, we will recall some notions and theorems from Hart (1977) .
The space H; consists of all non-atomic games in pNA' (i.e., limits in the supremum norm of all polynoms in non-atomic measures), which are homogeneous of degree one, superadditive and monotone. For a subset X of a linear space, x0 is a center of symmetry of X if for every x in X, its symmetrical image with respect to x,,, i.e., 2x,-x, also belongs to X.
The next three theorems are proved there (as Theorems A, B and C, respectively) : We return now to the monetary markets. To use the above results, we have to prove first the following: The proof will be given at the end of this section.
We come now to the Value Equivalence Principle. One should note that in the case of transferable utility markets, the set of value allocations is either empty, or consists of one member (the asymptotic value of the corresponding game).
The first theorem is the one part of the Value Principle which is always true. Proof. Follows immediately from Theorem 3.1 and Propositions 2.9 and 3.4.
The next theorem gives a necessary condition for the existence of the value:
Theorem B. Let v be a transferable utility non-atomic market satisfying (2.1)-(2.5). If v has an asymptotic value, then the set of competitive payofSdistributions and the set P of competitive prices each have a center of symmetry.
Proof: It is easy to see that the assertions for the two sets are equivalent, since
by (2.15), and since vp is a competitive payoff distribution if and only if p E P (Corollary 2.16). The theorem follows now from Theorem 3.2 and Propositions 2.9 and 3.4, As a consequence of this theorem, we will show now that the Value Equivalence Principle is not always true. Indeed, take any market for which P has no center of symmetry [e.g., whenever P is the convex hull of more than two price vectors -cf. Hart (1977) ; see also Example 4.61. The set of value allocations is then empty, whereas the set of competitive allocations is not (Proposition 2.9).
However, the next theorem will show that in general, this is not the case:
Theorem C. Let U = (utjrsI be utility functions satisfying (2.2)-(2.5). Let A = AU denote the set of all vectors a in 52 such that there is a transferable utility non-atomic market6 (a, U> with7 j a = a, for which the Value Equivalence Principle does not hold. Then A is a set of (Lebesque) measure zero in 52.
Proof. By Proposition 2.19, the set P of competitive prices is the set of supergradients of u, at a. The function u1 is concave on Sz [cf. A&S (Proposition 'I.e., the market with initial allocation a and utility functions U. 'The vector a is the 'total initial allocation'. Remarks. (i) The proof of Theorem C reveals the following interesting fact: although the utility functions are not differentiable, one gets almost always unique competitive price and payoff distribution (recall also Example 2.18).
(ii) Assumption 2.1 is necessary only to ensure that the core and the set of competitive payoff distributions coincide (Proposition 2.9). In case it is not satisfied, both Theorem A and Theorem B must be formulated in terms of the core. For the same reason, Theorem D does not depend on this assumption.
Theorem D. Let v be a transferable utility non-atomic market satisfying (2.2)-(2.5). Assume that (3.5) for every t, &,(x)/axj exists at every x in 52 for which xj > 0, for all
lsjsl.
Then v has an asymptotic value &I, and the core of v consists of the single measure dv.
PrOOJ< Assume first that (2.1) is also satisfied. We will prove that (3.5) implies that the set P of competitive prices consists of a single point. Let p E P, then Proposition 2.17 implies that p is a super-gradient of U, at z(t) for almost all t. Let 1 5 j 5 I, then s cej > 0 by (2.1), therefore z'(t) > 0 for a set of positive measure in I. Let ej denote the jth unit vector in R1 (i.e., whose jth coordinate is 1 and all others are 0), and let t be such that z'(t) > 0 and p E Au&(t)). Then, by definition of super-gradient, we get for I > 0 small enough By (3.5), the limit as I -+ 0 of the left-hand side exists, and equals au(z(t))/dxj, hence pj is uniquely determined, which proves that there is only one p in P.
We have proved that (3.5) implies that the core of v consists of only one point, assuming (2.1). But v does not change whenever commodities with zero as total initial allocation are added, hence the assumption (2.1) is not needed. The theorem now follows from Theorem 3.3 and Propositions 2.9 and 3.4.
Remark.
Theorem D includes the asymptotic part of Proposition 31.7 in A&S. In fact, we assume less (weak monotonicity instead of strict one,8 and existence of the partial derivatives only, without their continuity), and the proof is much simpler-no need for the complicate approximations in A&S (see especially $40).
To end this section, we have to prove Proposition 3.4. We will follow quite closely the results of Chapter VI in A&S.
Let U denote the set of utility functions {u~}~~~. U is of finite type if it is a finite set. by Proposition 37.11 in A&S, and let 8 be the above b-approximation, then which proves the lemma.
Proof of Proposition 3.4. For every E > 0 there is 0 of finite type such that 11 v-5 11' < E, where 11 11' denotes the supremum norm (Lemma 3.7). But 0 is in N; (Lemma 3.6), which is closed in the supremum norm, therefore v E H$. .
Walrasian markets
In this section we will prove our theorem for non-atomic markets without transferable utility (i.e., Walrasian markets).
As in section 2, we are given a trader space (1, %?), a positive non-atomic measure p on V and an initial allocation u satisfying (2.1). Unlike the transferable utility case, no (cardinal) utility functions are given. Instead, we have for each t in I, an ordinal preference relation >t on Q, which satisfies: Measurability. For any two measurable to Q, the set {t I x(t) >, y(t)} is in %T.
x >tY.
I Y >t x> and (Y I x >t v>l functions x and y from I
An allocation is a measurable function x from I to 51 such that J x = J u. It is called competitive if there exists a vector p # 0 in B such that (x, p) is a Walras competitive equilibrium, i.e., for almost all t in I, x(t) is maximal with respect to >t in tth budget set, B,(t) = {x E 0 1 p * x 5 p -a(t)>.
Let u = hLI be a family of utility functions, representing the given preferences {>t}ter; i.e., for every t in I, u,(x) > u,(y) if and only if x st y.
If U satisfies also' (2.59, a transferable utility market v = vu can be defined by (2.6).
gNote that (4.2) and (4.3) imply (2.3) and (2.4), respectively. As for (4.1), it implies strict monotonicity [i.e., x 2 y and x # y imply u,(x) > u,(y)], which is stronger than (2.2).
The allocation x is called a value allocation if there exists a family U of utilities, representing the preferences and satisfying (2.5), such that vu has an asymptotic value I&J", and
This definition is much more natural than Aumann's (1975) , since almost any family U is 'admissible' here, and not only bounded differentiable ones [the only requirement is (2.5), which ensures that v,(S) is attained for every S in WJ.
The definition of value in the non-transferable utility case is due to Harsanyi (1959) and Shapley (1967) . A good intuitive discussion of the non-transferable utility value in an economic context can be found in Aumann (1975) . The reasoning is as follows: First, one artificially assumes that uti2ity transfers are permissible. If the game vu which results has a value, and this value can in fact be achieved by an allocation x without any utility transfers, then x is a value allocation.
Theorem E. In a non-atomic Walrasian market satisfying (2.1) and (4.1)-(4.3), every value allocation is competitive.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Proposition 8.1 in Aumann (1975) . Let x be a value allocation corresponding to U, i.e., Combining (4.4) and (4.5), we get that P * w> -a@>> = 0, for almost all t in I. A standard argument now implies that (x,p) is a competitive equilibrium [e.g., Lemma 13.3 in Aumann (1975) ].
In the uniformly smooth case, the Value Equivalence Principle holds, as proved by Aumann (1975) . In the general case, this is no longer true. The following example shows it: (4.6) Example. Let [0, I] be the set of traders and let 1 = 3 be the number of commodities. The preference relations >t are the same for all t, and they are defined by the utility function u(x) = 0.7 -min x'+O.l * f xi.
15i$3 i=l
This is the so-called 'three-handed' glove market, cf. A&S (p. 203). The initial allocation is a(t) E (1, 1, 1) . Let P denote the convex hull of the 3 vectors, Then U(X) = min,.i53pi *x = minpsPp * x, and P is the set of super-gradients _-of u at (1, 1, 1) .
Let w be any utility function representing the same preference relation as U. We claim that dw (1, 1, l) , the set of super-gradients of w at (1, 1, l) , must be equal to where A is some interval of the positive real line, possibly empty. The proof is as follows: First, there must be a continuous and strictly increasing function h such that w = h 0 U. Second, let A be the set of super-gradients of h at 1 = ~(1, 1,l); then ccp E dw(1, 1,1) for every CI E A and p E P. Third, by considering the indifference surface through (1, 1, l) , we show that every q in dw(l, 1, 1) must be proportional to some p in P. And fourth, using the fact that u(v, y, JJ) = y for every y > 0, we prove that whenever ap E dw(1, 1, 1) for somep in P, c1 must belong to d/r(l).
Returning to the market, it is easy to check that the only competitive allocation is x = a (this follows from the quasi-concavity of the preference relations).
Suppose x were also a value allocation, with respect to a family JV = {w,) of utilities. Since dw,(r(t)) is of the form (4.7) for every t, the set Q of transferable utility competitive prices at x must be of the same form (by Proposition 2.17). Hence Q is either empty or is a truncated triangular pyramid, which has no center of symmetry, and this implies by Theorems A and B, respectively, that ZI,+, has no asymptotic value.
